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GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS, GOVERNANCE RISK,
AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
TIMOTHY MEYER*

INTRODUCTION
For years, scholars have considered the great bane of international
cooperation to be the much-scorned free rider. International public goods
such as climate change mitigation, vaccination against disease, reduction in
acid rain, and preservation of the ozone layer all require incentivizing states
to participate in international institutions when often the individually
rational thing to do is remain on the sidelines. Lawyers, policymakers, and
scholars have come up with a host of devices to deter free riding and
encourage participation in global public goods. Issue linkages, trade
sanctions, financial assistance, and minimum participation requirements are
just some of the carrots and sticks that states use in international public
goods institutions. And these tools are frequently successful. For example,
the Montreal Protocol, which governs ozone-depleting substances and uses
financial assistance for developing countries as a carrot coupled with the
stick of trade sanctions against non-members, has near-universal
membership and has been haled as the single most successful
environmental agreement to date.' But as the end of 2012 draws near, the
inability to conclude a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol is forcing
commentators to rethink their approach to supplying global public goods.
The traditional tools of international governance have proven inadequate to
generate meaningful international cooperation on climate change
mitigation. What, then, is the way forward?
I argue that the scholarly focus on increasing participation and
deterring free riders has caused commentators to underestimate the ways in
which common features of international legal institutions can undermine
those institutions' ability to facilitate cooperation. International institutions
can be designed in a number of ways that compound the risk of that
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank the
participants at the International Law and Global Public Goods Roundtable at Duke Law School and the
conference on Global Environmental Risk Governance at Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law for
helpful comments. Many thanks to Josh Weiner and Lawrence Winsor for research assistance.
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international cooperation will fail, which I refer to as governance risk. In
this brief article, I focus on two features of institutional design that are
intended to encourage participation in public goods institutions but can
create the risk of gridlock and governance failure. I illustrate the argument
with examples drawn from institutions bearing on international energy
governance.
First, many public goods institutions are epistemic institutions. They
establish processes for exchanging and evaluating information in an effort
to reduce scientific uncertainty as a barrier to bargaining over substantive
regulation among states with diverse epistemic and normative
commitments. However, states and private actors do not invest in research
on environmental harms behind a veil of ignorance. They frequently know
the distributional consequences of regulating a particular activity; that is,
they know which states (and domestic constituencies) stand to win and
which to lose from governing a particular activity. Institutions that -merge
the knowledge-exchange and development processes with the ability to
negotiate and impose binding legal regulations thus run the risk that states
that oppose the imposition of substantive regulations will use epistemic
processes as a way to try to block the adoption of substantive regulation.
Second, governance risk can be systemic. Policies adopted in one
institution can lead to governance failures or higher costs to cooperation in
other institutions. Governance risk is systemic when institutions are linked
in some way: institutionally, as when institutions have overlapping
jurisdiction or competence; at the bargaining table, as when states hold
cooperation in one institution hostage to extract concessions in an
otherwise unrelated institution; or functionally, as when two otherwise
unrelated institutions regulate different aspects of the same underlying
activity. Systemic governance risk is an underappreciated negative
externality of cooperation in the fragmented international legal system. For
example, cooperation in an area such as energy security, with its focus on
stable and cheap access to fossil fuel supplies, can crowd out cooperation
on climate change, with its focus on raising the prices of carbon-intensive
energy sources. States in one institution might also respond to the threat of
interference from another institution by attempting to obstruct the other
institution's mission, as members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) have done during the climate change
negotiations.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Parts I and II, I briefly sketch a
theory of institutional governance risk and systemic governance risk,
respectively. Institutions organized around the production of public goods,
such as climate change mitigation, are particularly prone to high degrees of
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governance risk. The institutional design choices that aim to increase
participation and reduce free-riding in public goods institutions, such as
creating negotiating bodies like the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that encourage broad membership by
extracting few upfront commitments from states, can sometimes exacerbate
governance risk by introducing epistemic and normative divisions among
negotiators that can paralyze institutions. Systemic governance risk, for its
part, is most frequently found among institutions that might appear
unrelated, but in fact regulate different facets of the same underlying
activity. Climate change institutions and energy institutions are a perfect
example. Actions taken under the auspices of the International Energy
Program (IEP) or OPEC can make cooperation under the auspices of the
UNFCCC costlier than it otherwise would have been.
Part III discusses several ways in which institutions might be designed
to reduce these governance risks. In short, I argue that sometimes further
fragmenting institutions by giving them very narrow mandates can reduce
both institutional governance risk, the risk the institution itself fails, and
systemic governance risk, the risk it causes other institutions to fail. I
explore this argument in the context of a relatively new intergovernmental
organization, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).
IRENA mitigates its governance risk by divorcing epistemic issues from
the ability to promulgate binding legal rules. IRENA's activities involve
almost exclusively the development and dissemination of information
related to renewable energy, with little to no possibility of serving as a
forum for the negotiation of legal obligations such as minimum renewable
energy requirements for states. At the same time, IRENA mitigates
contribution to systemic governance risk by focusing on long-run market
trends that are largely ungoverned by existing international institutions.
IRENA thus does not offer the promise of grand cooperation held out by
institutions such as the UNFCCC, but neither is it likely to founder on the
cooperative challenges those institutions face. Instead, institutions such as
IRENA-that mitigate the risks they pose to the interests of member states
and other institutions-offer the realistic possibility of incremental
cooperation on the provision of public goods.
I. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE RISK
Analysis of cooperation in the production of public goods has tended
to focus on deterring free-riding. International institutions that produce
public goods (hereinafter "public goods institutions") are thus designed to
incentivize states to participate in hopes that participation will increase
compliance with the institution's rules, and therefore contribution to the

322

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 22:319

public good. In the next two Parts of this article, I identify two common
techniques for encouraging states to contribute to public goods: the use of
epistemic institutions and issue linkages. By epistemic institutions I mean
international institutions that contain information-producing obligations
aimed at facilitating cooperation by reducing scientific and market-related
uncertainty. Issue linkage refers to a situation in which two or more issues
are joined such that the resolution of one issue affects the resolution of the
other. I argue that both these techniques for generating cooperation on
public goods create governance risk. By governance risk I mean the risk
that legal institutions and rule-making processes, and the substantive rules
that emerge therefrom, are not optimal from the standpoint of mitigating
underlying market or behavioral risks.2 Governance risk comes in at least
two forms, institutional governance risk and systemic governance risk. In
this Part, I analyze the risks of gridlock flowing from epistemic institutions
with broad participation, a form of institutional governance risk. In Part II,
I analyze the systemic governance risks created by issue linkages.
Institutional governance risk refers to the possibility that a feature of
an institution may make effective cooperation on achieving the institution's
mission costlier and therefore increase the risk of governance failure. The
intuition behind the notion of institutional governance risk is that when
designing institutions, states operate in an environment in which the
effects of their institutional choices are not known with certainty.4 Choices
about broad versus narrow membership, procedural rules, the scope of the
mandate, and the authority given to an international organization all affect
the likelihood that the institution will be successful in achieving its aims.

2. The idea that governance failures, as opposed to market failures or state failures, create risks
that should be studied in their own right, is drawn from the work of Bob Jessop. See Bob Jessop, The
Rise of Governance and the Risk of Failure: the Case of Economic Development, 50 INT'L SOC. SCI. J.
29, 38-41 (1998). The concept of "governance risk" also features prominently in studies of corporate
governance, which incorporates considerations of the risks posed by individual companies' governance
practices. For example, the MSCI publishes "governance risk indicators," which are available at:
http://www.msci.com/products/esg/stats/. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L.
REv. 487, 516-27, 538-43 (2007).
3. I use the term "institution" broadly to refer to both international organizations, including
diplomatic conferences, and bodies of substantive laws such as treaties.
4. Cf Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement
Flexibility, 55 INT'L ORG. 289 (2001).
5. In recent years, scholars working in international law and international relations have studied
extensively the various design features of international agreements. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 446-47 (2000);
Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L' L. 579 (2005); Kal
Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99 AM. J.INT'L L 581 (2005). In so doing,
they have both explained as a descriptive matter why international institutions look the way they do in
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Although a review of all the ways in which the design of an institution can
risk ineffective governance is beyond the scope of this article,6 I focus here
on the relationship between membership decisions and epistemic issues
arising from a lack of certainty about the underlying market failure in
institutions organized around the production of public goods.
In short, I argue that public goods institutions strive for broad
participation in order to discourage free-riding. Broad participation brings
with it normative and epistemic divisions, however, that can block
agreement on substantive cooperation. International agreements try to
reduce these divisions by creating information-producing obligations aimed
at reducing uncertainty about the regulated phenomenon. But states do not
engage in information production without taking into account the
distributional consequences of engaging in knowledge production that may
lead to substantive regulation. When it is clear that a state stands to lose out
from regulating a particular phenomenon, it may try to influence epistemic
processes in order to reduce the likelihood of regulation.
A. Participation and Epistemic Divisions
Broadly speaking, the fruits of international cooperation can be
divided into two classes: those benefits of cooperation that are excludable,
and those that are not. Goods that are non-excludable, meaning that those
states that do not contribute to the production of the good cannot be
prevented from consuming it, are often referred to as "public goods."
Goods that are excludable are referred to as "private goods" or "club
goods."7 Mitigating climate change is an example of a public good. The

particular circumstances and have also speculated about the desirability of alternative institutional
designs. Commentators have, for example, worried that the fragmentation of international law might
undermine or skew cooperation, see, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New
Clothes: PoliticalEconomy and the FragmentationofInternationalLaw, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007),
and thought about how international institutions can be designed to facilitate learning in the face of
uncertainty. Koremenos, supra note 4, at 310-12. Scholars have also analyzed how states bargain for
flexibility mechanisms in international institutions, such as exit and escape clauses, to insure against
individuals risks. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1599-1601 (2005);
Alan 0. Sykes, Protection as a Safeguard': A Positive Analysis of the GATT 'Escape Clause' with
Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 279 (1991); Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and
Renegotiation in InternationalLaw, 51 HARV. INT'L Li. 379 (2010).
6. In another work, I provide a more complete account of governance risk in international
lawmaking. See Timothy Meyer, Fragmentation and Systemic Governance Risk in International
Energy, (April 12, 2012) (University of Georgia School of Law Research Paper Series) (on file with
author).
7. In fact, public goods theory generally classifies cooperative goods both according to whether
the good is excludable and whether the good is rivalrous. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER,
THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 3-12 (1996) (defining public and

club goods). For my purposes, it is enough to focus on the excludability aspect of public goods.
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effects of climate change are felt globally. There is no way to prevent states
from sharing in the benefits which would come from averting the
catastrophic climate change that scientists predict will occur if global
warming is not held to a two degrees Celsius increase. Free trade, on the
other hand, is often described as a club good.9 A state can erect trade
barriers that deny particular states access to its markets, and allowing one
state access to one's markets does not preclude one from denying other
states access.
Where the benefits of cooperation are non-excludable, states will often
want institutions to have broad membership for at least two reasons. The
first is that the greater the number of contributing states, the stronger the
public good. Unfortunately, this goal is undermined by the logic of
individual incentives. Public goods are subject to free riding, meaning that
states do not fully capture the value of their investment in the public good
and cannot be prevented from enjoying the benefits of the investment of
others. States therefore have an incentive to withhold cooperation on a
public good or to fail to comply with a legal obligation to contribute to
one.10 International institutions seek to overcome this incentive to free-ride
in a variety of ways, including by expanding participation at the negotiation
stage. The hope is that participation and engagement in negotiations, such
as those that occur under the auspices of the UNFCCC, will lead to greater
compliance with the substantive rules that emerge from the negotiations."
The second way in which non-excludability encourages institutions to
foster broad membership is through concerns about legitimacy and
democratic governance. International institutions are often thought to suffer
8. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Fifteenth Session, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord para. 2, U.N.
DOC. FCCC/CP/2009/l l/Add.l (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/Il laO.pdf#page=4. ("We agree that deep cuts in global
emissions are required according to science, and as document by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees
Celsius."). Likewise, there is no way to prevent states from sharing in the costs of catastrophic climate
change. Global warming is thus sometimes referred to as a public "bad." The phrase "good" is not,
however, intended to connote something that is normatively desirable. Rather, the word "good" in the
expression "public good" is used in the sense of a commodity.
9. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade
Perspective, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 535, 536 (2008).
10. See, e.g., SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT & STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 199-205 (2003) (modeling the minimum participation necessary to
sustain some level of production of a public good).
11. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 (2005)
("In the end, therefore, rather than undermine the normative structure of the WTO, limited exit or
somewhat lower levels of discipline-in tandem with higher levels of participation and politics is the
best recipe for an effective and legitimate world trade system.")
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from a democracy deficit.1 2 They are not transparent, are too far removed
from accountable national governments, and in some situations can make
decisions with profound consequences without any input from affected
governments. 13 These features of international governance have put
pressure on international institutions to be more transparent and to expand
participation in decision-making to include non-state actors and all affected
states.14 This pressure is particularly acute where issues are perceived to
have significant consequences for states and their citizens, as where the
provision of global public goods such as climate change mitigation is
concerned. In part because of the high political salience of many public
goods issues, and in part because the regulations emerging from
international institutions may affect them anyway, states generally wish to
participate in international public goods institutions. From the standpoint of
democratic theory, then, cooperation on providing public goods
necessitates broad participation in negotiating the terms of cooperation.
The pressures for broad participation in public goods institutions can
make designing effective institutions, and in particular institutions that are
not gridlocked, much more difficult. One reason is that broad participation
makes it likely that there will be greater normative and epistemic divisions
among participants. In particular, states may disagree about the scientific
and market-related facts characterizing the issue on which they are
attempting to cooperate. Contests over knowledge have distributional
implications in the same way that contests over policies and legal rules do.
States and private actors are keenly aware of this fact, and therefore may
attempt to generate understandings of knowledge and risk that reflect their
underlying distributional preferences. 15 Knowledge of risk changes states'
calculations about how to regulate, because it changes states'
understanding of the costs and benefits of particular policies.' 6 To illustrate,
consider the expanded understanding of the effects of ozone depletion on
human health. The Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer was negotiated in 1985. It was negotiated by only forty-three

12. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challengefor InternationalEnvironmentalLaw?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 598 (1999).
13. Id at 598-99.
14. Id at 613.
15. Tora Skodvin & Arild Underdal, Exploring the Dynamics of the Science-PoliticsInteraction,
in SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 29 (Andresen et al. eds.

2000) (arguing that the political process can distort and delegitimize scientific processes by attempting
to influence them in support of political objectives).

16.

See Arild Underdal, Science and Politics:the Anatomy ofan Uneasy Partnership,in SCIENCE

AND POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 3 (Andresen et al. eds., 2000) (discussing
the role of scientific knowledge in promoting policymaking).
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countries and its principal obligations pertained to fostering research and
the exchange of information." Shortly after the Vienna Convention
negotiations concluded, however, scientists published two startling
findings. First, scientists discovered the now well-known hole in the ozone
layer over Antarctica." Second, scientists published a report in 1986
estimating that ozone depletion would cause 150 million additional cases of
cancer and three million additional deaths in the United States by 2075.'9
The increased scientific certainty about the costs of inaction spurred
international cooperation. In 1987, over sixty states participated in the
negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, an increase in participation of roughly
50 percent.20 Moreover, bowing to the inevitability of some regulation, the
industry group CFC Alliance reversed its former position and embraced an
international agreement capping CFC growth.2 1
Epistemic divisions among states can make reaching consensus on the
scientific basis for regulation, let alone the substance of regulation itself,
considerably more difficult. Moreover, the bargaining that characterizes
international rulemaking may result in lowest-common-denominator
regulation, in which the most uncooperative states set the level of
regulation. The climate change regime is a perfect example. For years
energy industry participants and oil-producing states sought to persuade the
public and other governments that the science of climate change, and in
particular studies on the human contribution to climate change, were
unsound.22 The presence of these groups thus created an epistemological
divide that impeded bargaining over climate change. Similarly, different
normative positions can prevent the adoption of arguably beneficial
measures. Oil-producing states, for example, have maintained within the
climate change framework that they should be compensated for revenue
lost as a result of climate change policies that, it is presumed, will decrease
consumption of oil. 23 And at the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC at Copenhagen, a small group of countries led by Bolivia, Sudan,

17.

DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 546 (4th ed.

2011).
18. Id at 550.
19. Id. at 551.
20. Id. at 552.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 675 (discussing OPEC nations efforts to block an agreement on climate change
measures).
23. See Jad Mouawad & Andrew C. Revkin, Saudis Seek Payments for Any Drop in Oil
Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.comi/2009/10/14/business/energy-environ
ment/14oil.html.
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and Venezuela prevented the conference from adopting the Copenhagen
Accord.24
B. Epistemic Obligations and Institutional Governance Risk
International institutions attempt to resolve epistemic divisions among
states by imposing obligations to create and share scientific information.
The framework/protocol method of regulation-seen in the ozone regime, 21
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,26 and the
climate change regime, 2 7 among others-relies on knowledge-based
assessments of environmental problems to change states' understanding of
the value of regulation. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution, for example, requires parties to cooperate on research in
technologies for measuring and reducing emissions of air pollutants. 2 8
Agreements like the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent2 9
and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 30 establish
processes by which states share information about hazardous chemicals.
Such information serves as the basis for considering whether to subject the
chemicals to greater controls. In short, institutions like those mentioned
above hope to generate cooperative solutions to public goods problems by
first generating consensus on the scientific underpinnings of the problem.
And these kinds of epistemic obligations in treaties are often successful.
Consensus reduces the costs of bargaining over regulatory cooperation, and

24. Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AM. J.
INT'L L. 230, 231 (2010). In Bolivia's case, this objection was in part because, in its view, the measures
agreed at Copenhagen and later Cancun would not prevent catastrophic climate change. See Louise
Gray, Cancun Climate Change Summit: Bolivians Dance to a Different Beat, but Fail to Derail the
Talks, THE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 12, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange
/8197539/Cancun-climate-change-summit-Bolivians-dance-to-a-different-beat-but-fail-to-derail-thetalks.html.
25. See generally Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985,
T.I.A.S. No. 11097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] and Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
26. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 2-5, Nov. 13, 1979, 34 U.S.T.
3043, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter LRTAP].
27. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] and Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
28. LRTAP art. 7; see also Vienna Convention arts. 3-4, annexes 1-11.
29. Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. I1, 1998, 38 I.L.M 1.
30. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 9, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.NT.S.
119 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
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so information-producing obligations have become a standard feature of
international environmental agreements.
But this process of reducing scientific uncertainty as a prelude to
regulation works best when the distributional issues arising from
prospective regulation are mild. Sometimes, however, the distributional
concerns associated with cooperating on the production of information will
be so severe that the production of information and the formulation of
binding legal obligations in the same institution will cause the institution to
gridlock. In effect, combining information-producing obligations with the
possibility of legal regulation causes states that expect to lose from
regulation to entrench themselves over epistemic issues in a way that raises
the transaction costs of resolving both epistemic issues and substantive
regulation. Epistemic issues essentially become an early stumbling block to
agreement on regulation. While contesting the development of scientific
knowledge might strike some as irrational at first glance, the logic is
similar to fights over institutional design and substantive policy choices.
Procedural rules affect the likely shape of substantive policies by altering
bargaining dynamics. If a two-thirds vote of the conference of the parties is
necessary to subject a chemical to a treaty's substantive controls, states will
expect the list of chemicals to which the treaty applies to grow at a faster
rate than if a consensus rule applies. States thus treat bargaining over
procedural rules as a means of contesting bargaining over substantive rules.
Similarly, epistemic obligations-obligations that require the production
and dissemination of information-that precede bargaining over
substantive regulations will often be negotiated and implemented with an
eye towards the substantive regulation that emerges. States that oppose
regulation will oppose epistemic obligations, and more likely try to
influence the way in which epistemic obligations are implemented and the
kinds of information they produce, as a means to influencing the
substantive policy choices that result.
Disagreements about the appropriate legal standard for dealing with
scientific uncertainty are in many ways fights about the distributional
implications of knowledge. The Stockholm Convention, for example,
establishes an elaborate review process through which proposals to subject
chemicals to regulation must be adopted." The precautionary principleholding that a lack of scientific certainty is not a legitimate basis for failing
to regulate a potential harm-is incorporated as a standard for evaluating
the scientific data presented to the reviewing committee. 3 2 During the
31. Id. art. 8.
32. Id. Lawyers, generally not specialists in science by any means, have devised legal doctrines
that aim to reduce the effect of epistemological divides on bargaining. The precautionary principle is
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negotiations, the United States, backed by the chemical industry, opposed
the incorporation of the precautionary principle into the Convention,
reasoning that a legal standard that favored scientific certainty would allow
it to avoid regulation on epistemic grounds. 33 During the negotiations the
United States also successfully pressured the European Union to agree that
the Committee charged with gathering data and making recommendations
as to what chemicals should be covered by the Convention could not begin
its work until the treaty entered into force, a move that delayed scientific
exchange and regulation of newly identified chemicals. 34 Moreover,
negotiations on expanding the Stockholm Convention's coverage to
additional chemicals have been extremely slow. 3 5 Similar dynamics
characterized negotiations between the United States and the European
Union over regulation of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs). 3 6 For
example, after the Codex Alimentarius Commission's standards were
incorporated into the WTO's Agreement on the Application of Sanity and
Phytosanitary Measures, the Codex Commission became a considerably
more politicized body as the EU and the United States fought over
appropriate standards for GMOs. 3 7 These kinds of distributional concerns
exacerbate governance risk and can prevent bargaining on the basis of the
best available scientific information.
The use of scientific information to set whaling quotas in the
International Whaling Commission (IWC) also illustrates how epistemic
processes can be used to frustrate substantive regulation. The IWC has long
contained an apparatus, including most notably a Scientific Committee, for
producing scientific information about whaling and market-related
the most notable of such rules, holding that a lack of scientific certainty is a not basis for failing to
regulate. See generally James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The PrecautionaryPrinciple:A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (1991). The precautionary principle, which can be understood as a legal rule obligating states to
discount epistemological disagreements that are matters of degrees of certainty, reduces the
impediments posed by epistemological concerns in two ways. First, it provides a rhetorical strategy
states and pro-regulation groups can use in attempting to persuade governments to enact regulations.
Second, its availability as a defense in disputes may make states on the margin more likely to act
unilaterally in regulating potentially harmful activities.
33. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 17, at 933.
34. U.N. Conference Approves POPs Convention in Stockholm, OUR STOLEN FUTURE,
http://www.ourstolenfuture.org/policy/pops/2001-0522popsconvention.htm (last visited Apr. 9,2012).
35. David L. VanderZwaag, The PrecautionaryApproach and the InternationalControlof Toxic
Chemicals: Beacon ofHope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution, 33 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 605, 620 (2011).
36. See MARK A, POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 85 (2009).

37. Id. at 165.
38. See James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution
Versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387, 413 (1994).
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information about whaling catches. 39 This information is used as an input
into the IWC's decisions setting whaling quotas. In the early years of the
IWC quotas were based on scientific advice, but the quotas suggested by
scientists were generally in line with interests of the whaling industry. 40 By
the 1970s, concern that whaling nations controlled the flow of scientific
and market-related information to the IWC featured prominently in
discussions of whaling regulation. 4 1 Critics worried that information
42
produced by whaling nations was neither impartial nor complete. In
response, there was a push for increased use of outside and independent
scientists within the IWC's Scientific Committee and the inclusion of
international organizations such as UNEP and the Food and Agricultural
Organization as observers.43 In terms of effects on generating scientific
consensus on whaling quotas, the success of this push for the independence
of scientists in producing independent scientific information is unclear. The
majority of scientists that participate in the Scientific Committee are sent
by national governments, 44 and there is a question as to whether those
scientists are truly independent of their governments. 45 As Andresen
reports, during the 1980s when polarization within the IWC was high,
scientific consensus on whaling policy was elusive in part because
scientists were often well-connected to environmental groups and national
governments that had normative commitments for or against a whaling
moratorium (which the IWC ultimately imposed) that were independent of
the scientific basis for that moratorium.46 In particular, scientists in the
Scientific Committee of the IWC are often also members of their national
delegations, creating implicit and sometimes explicit pressures on scientists
to conform their scientific advice to national preferences. 47
The IWC thus illustrates how epistemic obligations can be co-opted
by national interests and lead to what is arguably a case of institutional
failure. The IWC continues to impose a moratorium on whaling to this day,

39. See generally Steinar Andresen, The Whaling Regime, in SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 35 (Steinar Andresen et al. eds., 2000) (describing the
international whaling regime).
40. Id. at 41-42.
41. Id at 45.
42. Id
43. Id at 47.
44. Id. at 48.
45. Id. at 49.
46. Id. at 50.
at51.
47. Id.
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but the moratorium lacks the support of the Scientific Committee 48 and has
led to disputes among the parties, including a withdrawal and reaccession
to the IWC by Iceland and a pending case before the International Court of
Justice challenging Japan's whaling practices.49 Thus, while it would be an
exaggeration to claim that the disputes arising from the IWC's whaling
moratorium flow from the scientific processes at work in the IWC, it is
equally true that the IWC's epistemic processes have become an additional
venue in which whaling policies can be contested. That contestation, in
turn, affects the quality of information produced by the IWC.
II. SYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE RISK
Like other forms of risk, governance risk can be systemic. Systemic
governance risk refers to the possibility that actions or policies taken within
one institution make cooperation more difficult or costly in another
institution. The term systemic risk has been used differently in different
contexts, but the underlying definition generally involves a market or
institutional event that triggers additional institutional failures or makes the
institutional operating environment more difficult or costly.50 Scholars have
not appreciated the systemic nature of governance risk in the international
arena. To be sure, scholars have noted that international regimes are
fragmented, that they are often overlapping and non-hierarchical.s'
Scholars have studied how states behave in light of this fragmented legal
system, focusing on strategies such as forum shopping and the creation of
strategic ambiguity in the content of and relationship among legal
obligations.52 But issues of fragmentation constitute only a small part of
systemic governance risk. Studies of fragmentation tend to focus on issues
of institutional competence, including concerns about jurisdictional overlap
and choice-of-law rules to resolve conflicts. A systemic governance risk
perspective focuses attention on a much broader set of relationships
48. See Philip Hammond, Letter of Resignation from the Chairman of the Scientific Committee
of the IWC (May 26, 1993), available at http://www.highnorth.no/library/Management Regimes/
IWC/le-fr-th.htm (describing the Scientific Committee Chairman's resignation as a result of the
rejection of the Scientific's Committee advice as a basis of setting whaling quotas).
49. Whaling in the Antarctic (Japan v. Australia), Application, (May 31, 2010), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf.
50. Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEo. L.J. 193, 198 (2008).
51. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 277-78 (2004); Mark A. Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, Hardvs. Soft Law:
Alternatives, Complements andAntagonists in InternationalGovernance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 70708 (2010); Mark A. Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, Hard Versus Soft Law in InternationalSecurity, 52 B.
C. L. REV. 1147, 1149-52 (2011); Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 5, at 595-600.
52. See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 51; Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of
InternationalRegime Complexity, 7 Persp. On Pol. 13, 16 (2009).
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between institutions, including, most notably, functional relationships that
may not be captured by analyses of institutional conflicts and linkages.
A. Issue Linkages
How can governance risk be systemic? In short, cooperative
institutions can create or magnify the risk that other cooperative institutions
will fail. This kind of systemic governance risk is created when two
institutions are linked. Broadly speaking, institutions can be linked in three
ways: 1) through direct or functional linkages, as when action in one area
affects economic activity in another area (for example, a carbon tax may
change energy consumption and production patterns); 2) through issues that
are linked at the bargaining table; and 3) through issues linked
institutionally, as when trade measures are used to enforce environmental

obligations. 5 3
Legal scholarship has tended to focus on the third type of linkage, and
in particular the possibility that "slack" enforcement authority in one
regime (typically the trade regime) can be used to enforce the rules in
another regime.5 4 Scholars have, for example, analyzed the effectiveness of
trade sanctions as a device to enforce the Montreal Protocol's ban on
CFCs. 55 More generally, during the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars and
commentators were optimistic that trade regimes such as the WTO might
be linked to a host of obligations requiring contributions to public goods,
such as environmental and human rights obligations. 56
The logic behind this linkage is that club goods, such as market access
or financial assistance, can profitably be linked to contribution to public
goods, such as mitigating air pollution, as a solution to the familiar problem
of free riders.5 7 Oftentimes, a state's individual contribution to the
production of a public good is not rational; the state's individual abatement
efforts, in the context of an environmental problem, cost it more than the
benefits it receives from its own abatement efforts, and it receives the
benefits of the abatement efforts of others regardless of whether it makes
53. John Whalley, What Role for Trade in a Post 2012 Global Climate Policy Regime 8 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17498, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/wl7498; Oren Perez, Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation:
Exploring the Role of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 735 (2005).
54. Perez, supra note 53, at 747 (noting that linkages are thought desirable for their ability to
boost enforcement).
55. See, e.g., BARRETT, supranote 1, at 313.
56. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (2002) (analyzing trade and
linkages).

57.

Perez, supra note 53, at 747. On the problem of free riders, see generally MANCUR OLSON,

THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971).
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any such efforts itself. Club goods, because they are excludable, can be
used to change this incentive. If contributing to the production of a public
good allows a state to get both the marginal benefit from the public good as
well as some excludable benefit such as financial assistance, market access,
or technology transfer, a state is more likely to contribute to the public
good. This logic undergirds much of international environmental law. The
Montreal Protocol, for example, requires parties to ban the import from
non-parties of substances controlled by the Protocol,58 and also provides a
financial mechanism that provides "all agreed incremental costs" for
developing states to assist them in meeting their obligations under the
Protocol.59 Similar financial mechanisms have been created in a host of
other environmental agreements, including the Green Climate Fund
initially established through the Copenhagen Accord,o the Stockholm
Convention, and the Convention on Biological Diversity.62
B. Linkage and Systemic Governance Risk
This happy story of how issue linkages can reinforce cooperation,
while surely accurate in certain instances, underestimates the dangers to
cooperation posed by issue linkages. Linkages can be destructive as well as
constructive. 63 Where institutional and bargaining linkages are concerned,
the way in which linkages can be destructive is straightforward. The
traditional logic of linkages suggests that linking Issue I to Issue 2 should
make it easier either to strike a bargain on the two issues together, because
you can make trades across the issues, or to achieve greater compliance by
using the threat of losing benefits on one issue to force compliance on the
other issue.M Once a linkage is formed, though, it is easy to imagine
instances in which getting its way on Issue 2 is more important to State A
than preserving cooperation on Issue 1. In those situations, it might have
been possible for the states to cooperate on Issue I in isolation, but
cooperation on Issue 1 is destroyed by an inability to cooperate on the
linked Issue 2.65
A common example in international environmental agreements
illustrates the point. In public goods-producing institutions, the club good is

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Montreal Protocol, supra note 25, art. 4(l).
Id art. 10(1).
CopenhagenAccord, supra note 8, para. 10.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 30, art. 13.
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 21, Dec. 29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
Perez, supra note 53, at 776.
Id. at 747.
Id at 776.
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being offered as a sweetener to certain states, often developing states in the
environmental context. Developing states are therefore not expected to
contribute to the production of the club good. Institutions that offer a club
or private good as an inducement for states to contribute to the production
of a public good have to find some subset of states willing to contribute to
the production of both. The contributions to the club good come from
developed states. These contributions, which often take the form of cash
contributions to institutions such as the Green Climate Fund, thus are added
to the cost of developed countries' contributions to the public good. This
arrangement creates a second-order public goods problem. Increasing the
provision of the public good by incentivizing developing nations to
participate in environmental agreements raises the costs of contributing to
the public good for developed states. In the context of climate change,
developed states must both pay the cost of policies aimed at abating their
own emissions of greenhouse gases and, through the Green Climate Fund,
bear some portion of the cost of developing states' abatement policies.
This, in turn, makes free-riding by developed states more likely. In other
words, building public goods institutions by linking them to club goods,
such as foreign assistance, can unravel participation in public goods
institutions by encouraging developed states to free-ride.
Even more important for systemic governance risk are functional
linkages. States are unable to control functional linkages. States' only
decision when two issues are functionally linked is whether to deal with
them within the same institution or separately.66 Consider, by way of
example, energy security and climate change. Both are affected by the way
in which energy is produced and consumed. Policies adopted in one set of
institutions thus have important ramifications for the potential for
successful cooperation in the other institution. All else equal, if the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increases
production of oil, leading to a drop in oil prices and an increase in
consumption, it will be harder for states to meet their emissions reduction
commitments under agreements like the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, when
states parties to the International Energy Program (IEP) Agreement (the
parent agreement to the International Energy Agency (IEA)) agreed in June
2011 to release oil from the strategic reserves in response to oil supply
disruptions from Libya, they reduced oil prices, at least temporarily. 67 This
reduction in price furthered the IEP's economic objectives, but at the cost

66.

Cf ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 120-21 (2000).

67. Ann Florini, The IEA in Global Energy Governance, 2 GLOB. POL. 40,41-42 (2011).
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of mitigating the effects of a market event-the disruption of oil supplies
from Libya-that would have furthered climate change objectives.
In the case of cooperation aimed at reducing oil prices and cooperation
on climate change, governance risks are negatively correlated. Successful
cooperation on oil prices negatively affects states' ability to cooperate on
climate change, and successful cooperation on climate change negatively
impacts states' ability to cooperate on low oil prices. 6 8 Rather than
reinforcing cooperation, a functional link between negatively correlated
policies can actually undermine larger cooperative efforts. By contrast,
positively correlated risks pose both a threat and an opportunity. On the one
hand, if governance risk is positively correlated between two institutions,
then the failure of one institution makes the failure of the other more likely.
On the other hand, positively correlated risks will often mean that
successful cooperation in one institution reinforces cooperation in another
institution. For example, successful efforts by the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA) to spur diffusion of and innovation in renewable
energy technology should make climate change cooperation easier by
reducing the costs to states of agreeing to policies that reduce their reliance
on carbon-intensive fuel sources.
From a governance standpoint, the ideal institutional design
maximizes the expected gains from cooperation, adjusted for systemic
governance risk, across linked issues. One way to achieve this objective is
by designing institutions so that the governance risks posed by linked
institutions are uncorrelated. Thus, counterintuitively, one way to deal with
the fact that fragmented legal institutions pose systemic governance risks is
to further fragment institutions in a way that reduces the relationship
between governance outcomes across institutions, or at the very least
reduces the likelihood that a governance failure in one institution will make
cooperation harder in another institution. In the next section, I argue that
IRENA is an example of an institution that is designed to mitigate systemic
governance risk. It thus may offer a model for how to nest institutions in a
way that reinforces, rather than undermines, cooperation in linked
institutions.
III. MITIGATING GOVERNANCE RISK
In this Part, I describe a new international organization, the
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). IRENA is an

68. This differs from negatively correlated systemic risk among financial institutions, where
negatively correlated risks can be protected against through diversification. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 446 (6th ed. 2003).
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intergovernmental institution charged with promoting the development of
renewable energy around the globe. IRENA is designed in large part to
reduce the two types of governance risk described above. As an
organization engaged in facilitating the development of renewable energy
technology, IRENA faces risks from fossil fuel-exporting states that may
wish to contest the development of alternative energy sources. IRENA
could therefore face epistemic challenges from fossil fuel-exporting states,
and it could pose systemic governance risks to institutions such as the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Gas Exporting
Countries Forum, both of which aim to coordinate the production of fossil
fuels to ensure higher profits. However, IRENA is designed with a narrow
mandate that reduces these risks. Most notably, by denying IRENA the
power to impose legal obligations relating to renewable energy, IRENA's
creators reduced the incentive for oil-exporting states to resist IRENA's
epistemic mission to develop and diffuse renewable energy technology and
limited IRENA's ability to interfere directly with the legal obligations
created by other institutions.
IRENA thus may represent a second-best form of international
cooperation on renewable energy. Climate change negotiations in the
UNFCCC have stalled, with many states unwilling to undertake binding
legal obligations to reduce their emissions under present circumstances.
With top-down approaches failing, incremental bottom-up approaches such
as those envisioned by IRENA may be the best hope for interstate
cooperation on renewable energy. While such bottom-up approaches do not
promise the dramatic results that are thought to accompany legally binding
obligations coming out of institutions like the UNFCCC, by limiting their
governance risks they are also less likely to prompt the backlash that has
rendered the UNFCCC framework unable to move beyond 2012.
A. IRENA
The International Renewable Energy Agency was created in 2009.69
IRENA's chief objective is to "promote the widespread and increased
adoption and the sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy." 70 The
Agency's Statute charges it with fulfilling this mission by, among other
things, analyzing member states' laws and policies regarding renewable
energy and technology transfer; coordinating with other intergovernmental
and nongovernmental agencies; facilitating investment in renewable energy

69. Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency art. 1, Jan. 26, 2009, 48 I.L.M. 1223
[hereinafter IRENA Statute].
70. Id. art. II.
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and technology transfer; and encouraging research into renewable energy,
its effects, and how it can be effectively deployed.
IRENA differs from a number of renewable energy initiatives born in
the last fifteen years in that it is a stand-alone intergovernmental
72
organization. IRENA's organizational structure consists of an Assembly,
a Council, and a Secretariat.73 The Assembly is comprised of all member
states and is IRENA's "supreme organ." 74 Each member state has one vote.
IRENA's Statute mandates that the Assembly make decisions on matters of
procedure by a simple majority, and on "matters of substance" by
consensus, where consensus is defined as no more than two objecting
member states. The Council consists of a subset of the member states,
elected by the Assembly for two-year terms on the basis of "fair and
equitable geographic" representation.76 Like the Assembly, the Council
makes decisions by a simple majority on matters of procedure and a
majority of two-thirds on matters of substance (with the decision as to
whether a matter is procedural or substantive also decided by a two-thirds
vote). 77 The Council is in many ways designed to operate as an executive
committee of the Assembly, preparing the Agency's work program and
draft budget for submission to the Assembly and reviewing and referring to
the Assembly draft reports from the Secretariat. The Assembly's approval
is required to conclude agreements with states and other intergovernmental
bodies and to establish subsidiary organs.7 The Secretariat, for its part, is
charged with preparing in the first instance the Agency's work program and
budget, implementing the Agency's work program and decisions, and
providing support to the Council and Assembly.79
Broadly speaking, IRENA's activities are geared toward reducing the
transaction costs associated with investment in, and the development and
diffusion of, renewable energy technology. IRENA accomplishes this task
primarily through facilitating the availability and exchange of information.
Although an intergovernmental body, IRENA expressly lacks the authority

71. Id. art. IV.
72. Other renewable energy initiatives are either nestled within larger organizations, such as the
IEA's renewable energy programs, or are NGOs, such as the Renewable Energy & Efficiency
Partnership (REEEP). Structure of Partnership,REEEP, http://www.reep.org/512/structure-of-partner
ship.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
73. IRENA Statute, supranote 69, art VIII.
74. Id. art. IX(A)(1).
75.

Id. IX(F).

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. art. X(A).
Id. art. X(D).
Id. art. X(F)(6).
Id art. XI(E).
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to impose legal obligations on its members, is not designed as a body
aimed at facilitating the negotiation of legal obligations, and does not seem
80
inclined (at least yet) to venture into the realm of soft law instruments.
Rather, IRENA's work program to date has consisted of three initiatives:
Knowledge Management and Technology Cooperation (KMTC), Policy
Advisory Services and Capacity Building (PACB), and the Innovation and
Technology Centre (IITC). Although still in their early stages, each of these
initiatives aims to reduce the transaction costs to investment in and
diffusion of renewable energy technology in its own way.
The Knowledge Management and Technology Cooperation (KMTC)
initiative's objective is to create a global knowledge commons of sorts. It
pursues this objective in two ways. First, it creates Renewable Readiness
Assessments (RRAs), which provide an analysis of the soft structures,
including economic conditions and the legal and regulatory environment, in
place in individual countries.8 1 The RRAs, which are publicly available,8 2
provide information on soft structures to investors and also provide
recommendations to the host government on how it can create a legal and
regulatory environment conducive to attracting investment in renewable
energy infrastructure. Second, the KMTC initiative is assisting in the
creation of a "Global Atlas for Solar and Wind."83 The Global Atlas-an
idea from the Clean Energy Ministerial's Solar and Wind Working Group
that is now a partnership between donor states, IRENA, the UJNEP, data
and technology providers, and end-users-aims to provide an internetbased Geographic Information System for wind and solar resources.8 4 The
idea rests on the fact that, much like traditional fossil fuels, renewable
energy resources are often unevenly geographically distributed. Different
areas are more or less suitable for different kinds of renewable
infrastructure. Wind farms, for example, might be most profitably located
off the coast where the wind blows regularly. Solar farms are most
efficiently placed in areas with lots of sunlight and very few features that
might result in damage to solar panels. At the most elementary level, the
80. Id. art. IV(A)(1)(a) ("The Agency shall analyse, monitor and, without obligations on
Members' policies, systematize current renewable energy practices . . .").
81.

See e.g., INT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLES READINESS ASSESSMENT:

MOZAMBIQUE (2012), available at http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=Subcat&PriMenulD=
35&CatlD=109&SubcatlD=164
82. See IRENA Statute, supra note 69, art IX. Only two RRAs have been created so far, those for
Senegal and Mozambique. Renewables Readiness Assessments (RRAs), IRENA, http://www.irena.
org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=Subcat&PriMenulD=35&CatlD=109&SubcatlD=164 (last visited Apr. 9,
2012).
83. Global Atlas for Solar and Wind Energy, IRENA, http://www.irena.org/mcnulindcx.aspx?
mnu=Subcat&PriMenulD=35&CatlD-109&SubcatlD=163 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
84. Id
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Global Atlas can map the location of physical sites that might be suitable
for the installation of renewable energy infrastructure.85 The Atlas also will
include relevant information on economic conditions, as well as the legal
and regulatory environment in specific locations. 6
The public good of high-quality geographic data on renewable
resources reduces the transaction costs to planning and investing in
renewable energy infrastructure. Like other public goods, information
about suitable sites for renewable energy is likely to be underdeveloped.
Those who find suitable sites cannot be sure they will reap the benefits of
investing in the search costs. IRENA and its partners, by investing in the
development of this information, thus provide a resource to public
policymakers and investors that the latter might not develop themselves but
which they are able to use. The provision of this information is particularly
important in the energy sector, where infrastructure investment timelines
often stretch out decades.87 The development and systemization of the data
is also important. While significant mapping has been done in the
developed world, the developing world remains largely unmapped.88
Moreover, the information that exists is often compartmentalized among a
variety of organizations." A clearinghouse for information promises to
dramatically reduce search costs and thereby boost investment in renewable
energy.
The Policy Advisory Services and Capacity Building (PACB)
initiative further implements IRENA's focus on providing information that
reduces the transaction costs of investing in renewable technology
infrastructure and research. IRENA's Renewable Energy Learning
Partnership (IRELP) focuses on expanding and systematizing information
about education on renewable energy with the objective of reducing the
technology gap between developed and developing countries.90 Consistent
with its focus on an informational approach to promoting renewable
energy, IRENA also is preparing a report on the types of jobs supported by
the renewable energy sector and the skills necessary for specific job

85.

INT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY FOR A GLOBAL SOLAR

AND WIND ATLAS 9 (2012), available at http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/
GlobalAtlasforSolarandWindEnergy-Implcmentationstrategy.pdf
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 9, 14.
90. See Capacity Building, IRENA, http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=Subcat&
PriMenulD=35&CatID=10I &SubcatlD= 156 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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types. 91 Such a document performs the dual role of providing information
to policymakers on how to create renewable energy jobs, while at the same
time persuading them that investing in attracting renewable energy jobs is
beneficial. Finally, the PACB initiative also includes a database compiled
and maintained in partnership with the IEA-the IEA/IRENA Global
Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database-that provides a
searchable index to country specific policies and policy targets.92 A
potentially valuable tool for researchers studying comparative renewable
energy policy, the database also provides a starting place for investors
looking for information on renewable energy policies in target markets and
policymakers looking for policy ideas.
The final component of IRENA's program is the Innovation and
Technology Centre (IITC). While the KMTC and the PCBA generally
emphasize the availability of information on renewable resources and soft
structures, IITC emphasizes more directly the availability of and research
into technology itself. Not surprisingly, renewable energy technology is
subject to intellectual property protection. One goal of the IITC program is
to make ihe roughly 200,000 renewable energy patents known to the World
Intellectual Property Organization available online.93 More concretely, the
IITC program is in the process of developing draft reports on the cost
effectiveness of renewable energy, 94 while also examining the feasibility of
discrete technology transfers that IRENA might facilitate, such as biofuel
technology transfer from Brazil to Africa. 9 5
B. Epistemic Governance and Narrow Mandates
IRENA's institutional design offers a number of clear advantages
from the standpoint of governance risk. These advantages can be divided
into epistemic approaches to governance and an emphasis on reducing
risky overlap. In general, epistemic approaches to governance focus on
reducing institutional governance risk arising from disagreements about

91. Int'l Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy: Jobs Status, Prospects & Policies (2011)
(IRENA Working Paper), available at http://www.irena.org/Menu/index.aspx?PriMenulD=36&mnu=
Pri.
92. IEAIRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database, INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
93. INT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, REP. OF THE DIR. GEN.: PROPOSED WORK PROGRAMME
AND BUDGET FOR 2012 38 (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.irena.org/documents/upload
Documents/2assembly20l2%2F2012WPBA_2 1.pdf [hereinafter 2012 WORK PROGRAMME].

94. Summary of the IRENA Workshop on Renewables: Competitiveness and Innovation, IISD
REP. SERVICE, Oct. 7, 2011 at 1, availableat http://www.iisd.calymb/irena/iitco/html/ymbvoll87num5
e.html.
95.

See 2012 WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 93, at 37.
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how knowledge should be used, while reducing overlap mitigates systemic
governance risk.
IRENA's approach to epistemic governance yields three benefits from
the standpoint of institutional governance risk: it legitimizes the issues with
which IRENA is charged with dealing; by limiting its tasks to purely
epistemic charges rather than regulatory ones, IRENA reduces the
incentive for states that would lose from green energy requirements to be
obstructionist; and IRENA's epistemic tasks are aimed at influencing
market participants directly, rather than public policymakers exclusively.
First, one of the important ways in which governments contribute to
international public goods is by funding the institutions that contribute to
the production of public goods. Many governments, most notably the
United States, are reluctant to increase funding for international
organizations, however. 9 6 This leads to the common problem of unfunded
mandates, in which governments create obligations for other governmental
(in the national context) or intergovernmental (in the international context)
organizations without providing the funding necessary for them to carry out
their mission.
Creating an independent institutional platform for renewable energy
helps solve this problem by publicizing and legitimatizing the problem with
which the institution is designed to deal and creating an independent basis
for requesting funding from governments. In effect, the creation of a new
institution is a costly signal that those states backing the institution believe
there is an underlying problem that should be addressed through
cooperation. This signal changes the calculus of other states more
effectively than simply expanding the mission of an existing organization.
Moreover, it creates a more visible institutional framework for encouraging
state engagement, which in turn may put pressure on states to contribute
resources even if they themselves are suspicious of the organization's
mission.
A comparison between IRENA's budget and the IEA's budget
illustrates the resource effect the creation of a new, specialized institution
can have. The IEA, which also does quite a bit of work on renewable
energy, has an annual budget of roughly 626 million.97 Of this, only
roughly two percent, or just over $500,000, are devoted to renewable

96.

See DEP'T OF STATE, EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY FY 2011 FUNCTION 150 AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS 95 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
135888.pdf (noting the year-over-year decline in funding for international organizations in the US
budget).
97. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, IEA BUDGET (2010), available at: http://www.iea.org/about/IEA_
Budget.pdf.
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energy programs specifically.98 Moreover, a member of the IEA Governing
Board has pointed out that the IEA has seen virtually no real growth in its
annual budget over the last twenty-five years, meaning that any increased
budgetary allocation for renewable energy must come out of the pocket of
the IEA's more traditional programs focused on fossil fuels and
electricity.99 By contrast, IRENA's 2011 budget was nearly $25 million,
and its 2012 budget is over $28 million, all of it dedicated to renewable
energy programs.loo IRENA has thus very quickly assembled a pool of
resources for international renewable energy cooperation that dwarfs what
the IEA is able to allocate to the issue, and indeed nearly matches the IEA's
entire budget.
In addition to the epistemic signaling value flowing from its creation,
IRENA's activities are almost exclusively epistemic in nature, rather than
regulatory, and they aim to influence market participants rather than
governments and public policymakers exclusively. This emphasis on
shaping perceptions of risk and opportunities for renewable energy, with an
emphasis on the private sector and no institutional threat of legal
obligations for states, increases constructive engagement with IRENA and
reduces the incentive and ability for states to block IRENA's activities.
Contests over risks and perceptions of costs and benefits in other fora
are fraught with the implications for the legal rules and policies that flow
from particular understandings of real-world problems. Most obviously, if
climate change is in fact influenced by human activity, as scientists agree,
then energy institutions, including both traditional energy institutions such
as the IEA but also climate change institutions such as the UNFCCC, will
face political pressure to regulate carbon emissions swiftly and more
strictly. Oil-producing states and industry groups have thus contested
knowledge-based assessments of the risk from climate change as a
precursor to contesting the policies that should be adopted on the basis of
that knowledge.
As discussed in Part I, these contests over risk perceptions can
paralyze an institution. States will move to contest the development of
knowledge and perceptions of risk as a way to forestall efforts to develop
legal rules with adverse distributional consequences. IRENA addresses this
problem by divorcing epistemic issues from the possibility of legal

98. Ben Block, Interview with IRENA Director General Nominee Hans Jorgen Koch, WORLD
WATCH INSTITUTE, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/6172 (last updated Apr. 9, 2012 8:34 PM).
99. Id.
100. See 2012 WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 93, at 4. These figures include IRENA's core
budget (just over $13 million and $16 million in 2011 and 2012, respectively) as well as additional
voluntary contributions from Germany and the United Arab Emirates. Id.
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regulation. Within the framework of IRENA itself, the development of
informational resources is not threatening because IRENA lacks the ability
to translate epistemic consensus into legal obligations for states. IRENA's
governance risk-the risk that it will fail in its mission-is thus reduced by
drawing its mandate in a way that is less likely to provoke dissension
among member states. Of course, a consensus in favor of legal obligations
supporting renewable energy could still emerge based on IRENA's work.
But the fact that IRENA itself does not provide the framework for
negotiating obligations means the transaction costs of negotiating those
obligations will be higher. Counterintuitively, these higher bargaining costs
facilitate IRENA's epistemic mission. They reduce resistance from member
states and potential financial sponsors who stand to lose from legal rules
targeting carbon emissions. These states have less to fear from the
development and diffusion of knowledge because the international legal
response is further removed. There is thus less of an incentive to contest
and distort the development of information. In effect, IRENA's focus on
epistemic issues reduces the risk it poses to fossil fuel-producing states,
which therefore reduces IRENA's risk of regulatory failure.
Moreover, IRENA's approach to knowledge creation is to shape the
perception of renewable energy as furthering development objectives. The
PACB program emphasizes renewable energy jobs; the KMTC program
emphasizes reducing search costs for investors through the Global Atlas;
and the IITC program's emphasizes reducing search costs for renewable
patents, encouraging technology diffusion, and shaping perceptions of the
cost-effectiveness of renewable energy. All stress the economic potential of
renewable energy, rather than the environmental benefits and related
economic risks. This emphasis on economic benefits serves two critical
purposes. First, the value of renewable energy may not be obvious to public
policymakers in developing countries whose principal objective is to grow
their economy. By positioning itself as a development agency of sorts,
IRENA can increase the appeal of renewable energy infrastructure to
developing countries. IRENA's RRAs are a crucial tool in this effort,
identifying for states how they can best attract investment and encourage
energy development. Second, IRENA's focus on reducing transaction costs
for investment can mobilize private financial resources that, once invested
in the success of renewable energy, provide a political constituency in
favor of renewable support. This strategy of appealing to the private sector
is a bottom-up approach to building support for renewable energy, rather
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than a top-down approach. 10' By aiming at investors as much as
policymakers, IRENA avoids some of the pitfalls of top-down governance,
most notably the need to get state consent.102 IRENA may thus be able to
accomplish through direct market incentives and persuasion what it cannot
do through the creation of binding legal obligations.
IRENA is also designed to reduce systemic governance risk. IRENA
primarily creates systemic governance risk for institutions like OPEC and
the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). By encouraging the growth
and development of cheap renewable energy, IRENA could reduce demand
for oil and natural gas, thereby limiting OPEC or the GECF's ability to
coordinate production and influence prices. There are several features of
IRENA that mitigate this systemic risk by limiting the ways in which
IRENA's activities are functionally linked and negatively correlated with
the activities of other international organizations.
First, unlike the IEA, which limits its membership to OECD states,
IRENA's membership is not restricted to any particular group of states.
Fossil fuel-producing states, by making use of the consensus and supermajority rules employed by IRENA, are thus able to block any measures in
IRENA that would unduly affect their ability to govern fossil fuel
production. 0 3 From the standpoint of fossil fuel-importing states, IRENA
is complementary to climate change objectives and national policies
regarding fostering renewables.
Second, IRENA is aimed primarily at boosting the use of renewable
energy in the developing world. The initial RRAs have targeted Africa and
are moving into Asia and the Pacific.1 04 IITC's more specific efforts to
encourage technology diffusion have also focused on technology transfer
from Brazil to Africa.105 Moreover, while the developing world collectively
is a major consumer of fossil fuels, much of that consumption is driven by
China and India. 06 The creation of long-term renewable energy
101. See generally Daniel Bodansky, A Talc of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N.
Climate Change Regime, (Mar. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-1 773865.
102. See id. at 14-15.
103. This ability to limit systemic governance risk by blocking action could, of course, be a source
of institutional governance risk, i.e. fossil fuel-producing states could paralyze IRENA to prevent it
from affecting their ability to cooperate in OPEC or the GECF. As described above, however, IRENA's
design and the nature of the relationship between renewable energy and fossil fuels allow fossil-fuel
exporting states to play a more constructive role.
104. See 2012 PROPOSED WORK PROGRAMME, supra note 93, at 20.

105.

Id. at 37.

106.

See Richard K. Lester & Edward Steinfeld, The Coal Industry in China (and Secondarily

India) I (MIT Indus. Performance Center Working Paper No. 07-001, 2007), available at http://web.
mit.edulipc/publications/pdf/07-001.pdf ("China is expected to account for more than half of global
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infrastructure in other parts of the developing world thus is unlikely to
create a significant decrease in demand for fossil fuels from major
importers' in the short run. In the long run, fossil fuel supplies are likely to
run out and the fossil fuel exporting nations seem to be positioning
themselves to be leaders in energy technology in the developing world.
IRENA's geographic priorities and the relationship between fossil fuels and
renewable energy thus reduce the systemic governance risk posed by
IRENA.
IRENA's narrow focus on renewable energy also reduces the
jurisdictional overlap between IRENA and other intergovernmental
organizations. Although there are many organizations involved in
promoting renewable energy,107 and other organizations such as the World
Intellectual Property Organization that are relevant to IRENA's mission,
IRENA shares priorities with these organizations without having formal
institutional ties imposed upon it. The formal institutional linkages that
exist between IRENA and other organizations are therefore created with
IRENA's consent, rather than coming to pass as a product of overlapping
allocations of authority by states. IRENA's institutional partnerships, with
the IEA and WIPO, thus should not impose significant systemic risks for
those organizations. By virtue of being negotiated between the two
organizations, they are presumptively welfare enhancing for those
organizations.' Moreover, as mentioned before, IRENA does not have the
ability to impose legal obligations on its members, is not designed as a
body aimed at facilitating the negotiation of legal obligations, and has not
growth in coal supply and demand over the next 25 years ... [1]ike China, India derives over half of its
commercial energy from coal, and together the two countries are projected to account for over 68% of
the incremental demand in world coal through 2030."); see also InternationalEnergy Outlook 2011:
Highlights, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.cia.gov/forecasts/icol
more highlights.cfm#world.
107. For example, the IEA, the G20, the World Bank, and REN21 are but some of the institutions
involved in global renewable energy programs. The IEA, for example, has made energy efficiency a
priority, focusing on how energy efficiency measures and the installation of clean energy technology
can help states meet climate change objectives. See Ann Florini, The IEA in Global Energy
Governance, 2 GLOB. POL. 40, 44 (2011). The G20 has established a series of energy working groups,
one of which is devoted to clean energy and energy efficiency. Thijs Van de Graaf& Kirsten Westphal,
G8/G20 and Energy Governance, 2 GLOB. POL. 19, 26 (2011). For its part, the World Bank has Climate
Investment Funds that "represent more public finance than has ever before been dedicated to climate

change." Peter Newell, The Governance of Energy Finance: The Public, the Private and the Hybrid, 2
GLOB. POL. 94, 96 (2011).

108. See generally Karen N. Scott, International Environmental Governance: Managing
Fragmentation through Institutional Connection, 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 177 (2011) (discussing
agreements and formal cooperation among multilateral environmental institutions); MARGARET A.
YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2011) (analyzing the interaction between trade regimes and environmental regimes dealing with
fisheries).
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tried to promulgate soft law instruments. IRENA is therefore unable to
impose legal obligations on its members that are inconsistent with other
obligations they may have.
The result is an international organization that's relative lack of
linkages may prove to be a strength. In researching the design of
international agreements, scholars have argued that in some cases soft law
may be superior to hard law because states are willing to make deeper
commitments if the commitments are not legally binding. 109 Concems
about governance risk suggest a similar prescription. In some instances,
drawing the mandate and powers of an international institution narrowly
may facilitate cooperation to a greater extent than giving the institution a
broad mandate and powers, given the institutional and systemic risks
entailed in such a broad reach. While much remains to be seen about how
IRENA will operate in practice, its limited mandate allows it to focus on
improving access to affordable renewable energy technology without
having its ability to function undercut by policy choices made in different
institutions.o10 While perhaps not a first-best solution, in that it does not
impose renewable development and utilization obligations, it focuses on
building support and capacity for renewable energy in a way that
complements both energy security and climate change objectives.
CONCLUSION
International institutions are a response to the fact that many market
failures cannot be addressed by states individually. International
institutions facilitate cooperation in a wide variety of ways, including by
imposing rules on states; providing frameworks and bodies in which states
can more effectively bargain to cooperative solutions; and, where public
goods are concerned, encouraging broad participation in international
institutions. At the same time, however, institutions create risks that are
often underappreciated. In particular, two common techniques for
encouraging broad participation in public goods institutions-epistemic
cooperation as a prelude to bargaining over substantive regulation and issue
linkages--can raise the costs of cooperation or cause cooperative
institutions to fail in their missions in ways that scholars have not fully
explored. Joining epistemic obligations to institutions designed to produce

109. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 601-04. See generally Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer,
InternationalSoft Law, 2 J. L. ANALYSIS 171 (2010).
110. This is not, of course, to say that IRENA may not be undermined in its ability to accomplish
its mission. Oil-producing countries in particular may have an interest in controlling the type of work
that IRENA does and the pace at which is accomplishes its work. Indeed, there is some evidence that
oil-producing states have developed outsized influence within IRENA.
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substantive regulation can lead states that expect to lose from regulation to
use epistemic processes as a means to delay or distort bargaining over
substantive regulation. This is a form of institutional governance risk, a
feature of an institution that makes it less likely it will accomplish its stated
mission. Governance risk can also be systemic, as when policies
implemented in one institution raise the costs of cooperation, or cause
outright cooperative failures, in other institutions. This occurs when the
two institutions are linked either institutionally, by states in bargaining
processes, or functionally as when two institutions regulate different facets
of the same underlying activity. The way in which cooperative solutions
create negative externalities for other cooperative problems has been
underappreciated in the literature on international law and deserves more
study.
This article begins that study by examining how IRENA tries to
mitigate both conventional governance risk and systemic governance risk.
IRENA's institutional design suggests two approaches to mitigating
governance risk. First, IRENA divorces epistemic issues from rulemaking
powers. Where epistemic issues have deep distributional implications,
trying to use an institution both to build a knowledge-based assessment of
the risks posed by the underlying market failure and to negotiate rules
based on that assessment risks creating the gridlock that has characterized
much of the negotiations in the UNFCCC. IRENA solves this problem by
confining itself to dealing with epistemic issues, in attempting to frame
renewable energy as a pro-business enterprise and working to create a
knowledge commons for renewable energy. Second, IRENA reduces the
systemic risk it poses through its very narrow mandate. IRENA's mandate
directs it to focus on long-term strategies for growing the use of
renewables, largely in markets that are not heavily tied to fossil fuels.
While this narrow mandate may to some extent reduce the upside to what
IRENA can accomplish, it also limits the downside risk of hurting
cooperation efforts in other energy institutions.
Institutions such as IRENA thus may offer a model for cooperation on
global public goods problems such as climate change that have bedeviled
governments for years. Counterintuitively, by removing itself from the
array of institutions aimed at creating legal obligations, IRENA may be
able to increase its overall effectiveness. It does not hold out the great
hopes for sudden and sweeping change that are often associated with large
multilateral processes such as the JNFCCC. Instead, it offers more modest
and achievable goals on the back of which more expansive cooperative
efforts may someday stand.
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